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Abstract
In design practice and in design research the term ‘experiment’ is widely used and often
misused. To some extent, this can be ascribed to the fact that the experimental method
comes close to or partly overlaps the approaches of ‘trial and error’ and ‘reflection-inaction’, as defined by Donald Schön. Nevertheless, these methods or rather approaches
differ in regard to their aims, results, and context of application.
Based on an investigation in design literature and various case examples from practice-led
doctoral research, this paper attempts to highlight the differences between scholarly
experiment,‘trial and error’ and ‘reflection-in-action’. The initial point of this investigation
is from the perspective of the so-called New Experimentalism: a branch of the philosophy
of natural science, and from the work of Ian Hacking that redirected and broadened the
traditional conception of experiment. Hence, the role of creative practice in design
research will be scrutinized from the perspective of New Experimentalism. The goal is to
justify the role of artefacts in practice-led design research and in making and doing
(action, intervention) as an experimental practice that contributes to the creation of
knowledge and the construction of theory.
Keywords: experiment, new experimentalism, reflection-in-action, trial and error,
practice-led design research
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Introduction
So-called practice-led research in art and design has been under debate for nearly three
decades. One of the major issues in this debate is the role of the creative practice of the
artist, and/or designer-researcher, in the field of research. Nevertheless there is an
agreement, that “… under certain circumstances, practice may form a part of a PhD study
either through being structured as a method for collecting data systematically or as a
means to allow structured reflection upon practice” (Durling 2002). How these
circumstances are understood is broad and art and design should not be separated from
other research fields. In order to clarify the role of creative practice in art and design
research in more detail, various approaches have been made. The arguments of the
experience design research are of note (Biggs 2004; Mäkelä & Nimkulrat 2011).
However, the role of creative practice and artefacts in art and design research is not yet
explored to its full extent.
In this paper the role of the artefact in design research will be scrutinized from the
perspective of experimentalism. On the one hand, the so-called New Experimentalism: a
branch of the philosophy of natural science, changed the direction of the discourse on
experiment. This new approach to the experiment and its consequences for the
interpretation of practice-based design research has not yet been reflected upon within
the design research community. On the other hand, in creative disciplines such as art,
design and architecture it has been common for decades to refer to the act of creative
making and doing and to the resulting artefacts as experiments or experimental.
Nonetheless, apart from a few recent exceptions (Koskinen, Binder & Redström 2008;
Küçüksayraç & Er 2009; Hall 2011), the implications of the experimental method on
design and design research have been poorly understood. In design the term experiment
is often used colloquially or in the Schönian sense of reflection-in-action (Schön 1983),
but not in a scientific sense.
In order to shed light on these issues, the paper firstly introduces principles of
experimentalism and New Experimentalism. Secondly, the paper explores the usage of
the term experiment (and its derivatives) in design literature and reflects on its
appropriateness. This will be done by hermeneutic analysis of historical and more recent
sources. Thirdly, the paper discusses four research projects that include creative
practice. Based on the insights of New Experimentalism, it will be argued that in practiceled design research the creation of artefacts and the act of making and doing (action,
intervention) are equivalent to experiments in other fields. The aim of the paper is twofold.
First: to raise awareness of the differences between the usage of the term experiment in
professional design practice and in design research; second: to justify the role of artefacts
as experimental objects that contribute to knowledge creation and the construction of
theory.

‘Experiment’ in Science and its Derivatives
Since Early Modern Times experimentation has been considered as a central method for
gaining knowledge in natural science. While in the ancient world philosophers were
interested in the observation of natural phenomena, Francis Bacon was notably the first
to argue that observation is not enough, but one must `twist the lion’s tail´, i.e. intervene
in nature, in order to learn its secrets. According to him, knowledge of general principles
results from unbiased observation, experimenting, accumulating data and setting up
th
generalisations based on this data. In the 17 century his approach fired the scientific
revolution and – as Hacking (1983) pointed out – the ‘experimental method’ became “just
another name for the scientific method”. Galileo Galilei, the philosopher and physicist;
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Isaac Newton, the originator of classical mechanics and, later on, John Stuart Mill the
philosopher strengthened this tradition of inductive reasoning (Heidelberger 2007). Mill
characterized the logic of the experimental method as a Method of Agreement and
Difference (or Concomitant Variations). In other words the experimenter has to
demonstrate that in a controlled environment variations of factor A correlate with
variations of a given phenomenon Q in order to prove a causal connection between A
and Q. In order to exclude confounding factors in the environment, experimentation
requires closed, consistent conditions, ideally a laboratory (Schön 1983).
th

th

In the 19 and 20 century, various natural scientists, historians of science and
philosophers such as Justus von Liebig, Pierre Duhem, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn
vehemently refuted the English tradition of inductive reasoning. Referring to Newton’s
laws of universal mutual gravitation and Ampère’s theory of electromagnetism, Duhem
proved that these laws and theories, which claimed to be alleged prime examples of
induction, were by no means a derivation from observed facts. Instead of this, the raw
facts of experimentation had to be reframed and shaped in a symbolic form by means of
arbitrary hypotheses. According to him, observation has to be interpreted within a
theoretical framework in order to be useable in physics. Thus, the necessity to express
the experimental data in a symbolic manner disables the inductive method (Heidelberger
2007). During the ensuing period, his arguments were influential. Karl Popper, an
‘extreme anti-inductivist’, carried on this approach. From his point of view, theory based
on hypotheses comes first and the central aim of conducting an experiment is to eliminate
unfounded hypotheses (Heidelberger 2007). Until the 1970s, the discourse on experiment
was dominated by an overly theoretical approach and the primacy of theory was taken for
granted.

New Experimentalism
Ian Hacking deserves the credit for having redirected the discourse on experiment by
criticising the primacy of theory and emphasising the importance of the material
dimension, experience and skill. Thus, his work “Representing and Intervening.
Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences” (Hacking 1983) is regarded as
a ”pioneer work of New Experimentalism“ (Chalmers 2008). Choosing historical
experiments from various natural sciences (chemistry, optics, thermodynamics etc.) as
case studies, Hacking provided evidence that it is a mistake to view experiment as a
simple controversy between advocators of the inductive and the deductive approaches.
He depicted the relationship between experiment and theory as manifold and claimed,
that “any one-sided view of experiment is certainly wrong” (Hacking 1983:66). Suggesting
that there are various approaches, he advances this classification: “Some profound
experimental work is generated entirely by theory. Some great theories spring from pretheoretical experiment. Some theories languish for lack of mesh with the real word, while
some experimental phenomena sit idle for lack of theory” (ibid:159). Furthermore,
Hacking identified `happy meetings`, where experiment and construction of theory are
undertaken independently of each other, but meet in the end. He even considers trial and
error and invention to be preliminary stages of the experimental method, in case they are
then followed by theory. The science of thermodynamics, for instance, arose from a
profound analysis of the principles of high-pressure steam engines, which had their
origins in the inventions of Watt and others.

Reflection-in-action
The same year, when Hacking published “Representing and Intervening”, Donald A.
Schön released “The Reflective Practitioner. How Professionals Think in Action” (Schön
1983). This treatise was highly regarded by the design research community. Much like
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Hacking, he looks into experimentalism, but from another perspective. Schön’s main
concern is how professionals solve problems in their day-to-day practice. In order to
characterise the “fundamental structure of professional inquiry” he came up with the
concept of “practitioner’s reflection-in-action”, which “necessarily involves experiment”
(ibid.:141). On the one hand he held up the dominant deductive approach and pointed out
the similarities between experiments in science and in professional practice: “In the onthe-spot experimenting characteristic of reflection-in-action, the logic of hypothesis testing
is essentially the same as it is in the research context. If a carpenter asks himself `What
makes this structure stable?` and begins to experiment to find out – trying now one
device, now another – he is basically in the same business as the research scientist.”
(ibid.:147). On the other hand he clearly accentuated important differences. Unlike the
laboratory experiment, which aims to understand things and demands that we test
hypotheses in an objective, unbiased manner, experiments under conditions of everyday
professional practice aim to improve things or transform a situation. Here understanding
is not the ultimate goal, but rather a means for successful intervention. In Schön’s words:
“The practitioner has an interest in transforming the situation from what is to something
he likes better. He also has an interest in understanding the situation, but it is in the
service of his interest in change” (ibid.:147). Thus, the practitioner stops his inquiry when
he achieves change for the better, “even when he has not exhausted his store of
plausible alternative hypotheses” (ibid.:151). Furthermore, Schön claims that hypothesistesting experiments are not the only kind of experiment. He further identifies problemsetting experiments, where the problem or the question is set in a way that it can be
solved; exploratory experiments, when action is undertaken only to see what follows; and
move-testing experiments, when action is undertaken to achieve an intended change. He
claims that in practice these types often occur concomitantly – and from his point of view
this constitutes the “distinctive character of experimenting in practice” (ibid.:147).

Trial and Error
Schöns account of experiment in the context of professional practice and reflection-inaction exhibits, to a great extent, the same characteristics as the method of trial and
error. According to Mittelstraß (1980), trial and error is a “method for problem solving in
such situations in which (1) an aim and hence a success criterion for problem solving is
given, (2) various alternative solutions are possible, (3) it is known, that all of them are
akin successful or unsuccessful and (4) it is unknown which trial will lead to success”. In
such a situation any number of trials have to be undertaken until after ruling out aberrant
choices, a successful choice is found. Obviously, the trial-and-error method is solutionoriented, problem-specific, and it does not aim at generating knowledge or theory – three
features, it shares with Schön’s concept of the “practitioner’s reflection-in-action”. Thus, it
is debatable, whether reflection-in-action is closer to the trial-and-error method than the
scientific method.
However, Schmidgen, Geimer, and Diering (2004) characterize trial-and-error as a
“rudimentary form of experimental action”. Hackings argument in respect to the invention
of the steam engine, which emerged from trial and error, and the subsequent
development of thermodynamics indicates that there is a thin line between such groundbreaking inventions and experiments set up for the purpose of scientific observation. In
some cases inventions have the potential capacity to inspire basic research and the
generation of theory.

The Usage of the Term ‘Experiment’ in Design
In design the term experiment is under debate. Dilnot (1998) asserted that: “for design, in
effect, experiment is impossible”. He puts ‘experiment’ on a level with ‘laboratory
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experiment’ in that it requires closed, coherent and consistent situations in which it can be
performed. Consequentially, he suggests replacing scientific experiment and prediction
by proposition and explanation. He argues: “Propositions are to design what experiment
is to science. […] if experiment is in reference to rule (“if this, then that”); design is in
reference to possibility (“could this be?”) […] i.e. ‘could this (potential thing) be …
successful in its enactment in terms of desired ends and in relation to the likely
environment/s it will encounter” (ibid:92f).
Were laboratory experiments conducted in design? Content analysis of historical texts
proves that Walter Gropius ([1935] 1956) the founder of Bauhaus, used the term
experiment frequently. He called the school, its programme and projects an “experiment”,
and the Bauhaus workshops “laboratories”. The question then arises, “what is the subject
of this research?” Projects such as the Dessau-Törten Estate, erected 1926-28 in the
neighbourhood of the Bauhaus Dessau (figure 1), as well as essays by Gropius (1956)
and current research shed some light on this question. Doubtlessly, the single-family
terraced houses in Dessau-Törten were innovative in various aspects. To begin with, the
architect and his team tested new construction materials (concrete slabs, concrete
building blocks, hollow blocks etc.), standardized elements and new construction
methods, which were inspired by the industrial assembly belt production of the Ford
Motor Company in Detroit. Furthermore, the architects investigated functional
requirements of habitation and developed new ground plans. Last but not least, they
established a showcase of modern architecture. Clearly, the estate was radically new in
terms of technique, function and aesthetics. Nonetheless, it was neither a proper
laboratory experiment nor a proposition for the inhabitants, as Dilnot might suggest.
Instead of this, the erection of the estate resembles a so-called collective, socio-technical
field experiment, conducted in full scale and in real-time, as described by Bruno Latour
(2004). The estate was realized without impact assessment. Moreover, in contrast to
scholarly experiments in the laboratory or in the field, both experts and laypersons
assessed the houses and commented on them. However, various problems occurred
concerning the technical aspects of the experiment. Some months or years after
completion miscellaneous structural defects occurred; the steel doors iced over, some
walls exhibited shrinkage cracks, to name but a few (Bauhaus Dessau 1996). The
behaviour of the materials indicated what was and what was not practicable. One could
easily learn from this. Regarding functional and aesthetic aspects, the houses provoked
criticism and raised objections from the inhabitants and from conservative or nazi
opponents. The inhabitants of Dessau-Törten interfered with and changed the inner
structure as well as the outer structure and appearance of the houses according to their
own needs and tastes (figure 2-3) (ibid; Heinecke, Krehl and Steets 2003). In this respect,
Gropius and his colleagues were not willing to address the consequences. Although
negative feedback is to experiments in art and design what a breakdown is to
experiments in the sciences, basically they ignored the critique raised by the audience.
Their self-perception of being avant-garde impeded Modernists to accept the critique
(Gombrich 1980).
In conclusion, there are good reasons to question the usage of the terms “experiment”
and “laboratory” in the Bauhaus. In respect to technical investigations it comes close to
experiments in science; but in respect to aesthetic investigations it differs fundamentally.
Nonetheless design practice was connected to theoretical consideration, even though the
criticisms were normative in nature and feedback from the field was lacking. Finally,
Gropius’ usage of these terms can be understood as metaphors that brought design and
architecture in to the vicinity of the then highly prestigious natural sciences.
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Figure 1 Walter Gropius: Terraced Houses in Dessau-Törten, 1928.
Figure 2 Facade of the Terraced Houses in Dessau-Törten, around 2000.
Figure 3 Interior of a House in Dessau-Törten, around 2000.
Source: Fig 1 Bauhaus-Archiv, Museum für Gestaltung, Berlin; Fig. 2, 3 Nils Emde.

At least, since the modernist ideas in design, the term “experiment” has become
widespread in the design community, as a literature review in the German design
magazine “form, Zeitschrift für Gestaltung” indicates. A query in the ‘form’ online-archive
(www.form.de) shows 350 hits for the term ‘experiment’ and its inflections during the
period 1957-2007. A deeper analysis of the articles and reports sheds light on the usage
of the term by the authors and the implicit meaning it receives from that: products, that
stand out from accustomed shapes, established product categories, and familiar use, and
products that challenged the borders of technical feasibility or cultural acceptability – such
products were called ‘experimental designs’. Figure 4–6 show three examples of what is
meant by ‘experimental design’ by design journalists, designers and companies. Their
focus is on innovative, outstanding products that attract a great deal of attention from
media and market.

Figure 4 Verner Panton’s design Atmosphére for the publisher Spiegel Verlagshaus (1968).
Figure 5 Luigi Colani’s Total Living Unit (1969).
Figure 6 Fernando and Humberto Campana, Armchair with cuddy toys (2004)
Source: Fig 4 http://designmuseum.org; Fig. 5, 6 www.form.de

Reflection or contextualisation within a theoretical framework, not to mention generation
of theory, is usually beyond the interest of the authors in the ‘form’ magazine. Thus,
referring to the scholarly concept of experiment described above, there is no doubt, that
most designers pursue “a rudimentary form of experimental action” (Schmidgen, Geimer
& Diering) i.e.; trial and error. During the design process, they may often be in the
situation where they ask themselves ‘How can I master this or that?’, and advance
several alternative hypotheses. As hypothesis-testing practitioners, they apply the same
logic as the hypothesis-testing scientist, described by Schön. Nonetheless the difference
between both activities is fundamental. This becomes obvious in a text from Willy Rotzler
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(1961), where he comments on the significance of experiments in product design.
According to him, the main tasks of experimental design are testing processing
technologies and workmanship of materials on the one hand and artistic studies of form,
shape, and style on the other. Here he regards unique pieces as an ideal testing ground
for industrial production, since a “derogatory failure of the experiment” does not have
serious consequences. This very phrase “a failing experiment” illustrates the attitude of
the practitioner. In contrast to the scientist, for whom experiments do not fail according to
whether they approve or challenge a hypothesis, the focus of the professional designer is
solution-oriented: he judges the outcome of an ‘experiment’ by the achievement of an
‘effective’ result, i.e. an achievable and aesthetically convincing product.
In conclusion, design practice borrows the term experiment from the sciences (and the
arts) but uses it in a different, colloquial manner, without a proper understanding of its
scholarly implications. Basically, it is much more appropriate to describe the so-called
experimental design activities of practitioners as trial and error or reflection-in-action, and
describe the results as groundbreaking, innovative, spectacular, or razzle-dazzle
products.

Experiments in (so-called) Practice-led Design Research
In contrast to trial and error or reflection-in-action in design practice, in design research
experimental artefacts and physical making and doing are closely connected to the
generation of knowledge. Experimenting is manifold as described by Hacking. This is
substantiated below by four case examples from doctoral research and funded projects.
Case example 1: The applied research project Product Semantics of Smart Clothes,
conducted at the Lucerne School of Design and Art, serves as an example for studies, in
which experimental designs were based on a hypothesis in order to test them (Adler,
Weber Marin, Steffen 2009). The starting point was the observation that Smart Clothes
lack market success, since they are either driven by technology or by art. In both cases,
they neglect the needs and wants of customers and the requirements of daily use. These
insights led the research team to question the semantic expression and the usability of
current Smart Clothes. Based on design semiotics, the team set up hypotheses on
symbolic product character, which is culturally acceptable. Based on that briefing these
hypotheses were converted into requirements for the design of two Smart Clothes: a shirt
for prevention of back pain for clerks who do sedentary work, and a luminescent and
reflecting security jacket for children (figure 7, 8). Focus group discussions on models
and sketches of the new designs and subsequent analysis of this data served to reassess
the hypothesis and to draw conclusions on the user preferences to the semantic and
functional aspects of Smart Clothes (ibid.).

Figure 7, 8 Andrea Schumacher: Security Jacket for Children under various
lighting conditions. Back Manager: T-shirt and various feedback-devises (2009)
Source: Andrea Schumacher, Archive Lucerne School of Design and Art.
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Case example 2: The initial point of Kristina Niedderers’ dissertation Designing the
Performative Object (Niedderer 2004) were observations and reflections on her own
design practice in the field of silver and tableware design. She had created a set of
special drinking vessels called Social Cups (figure 9). Since the vessels have no base, at
least three of them have to be connected with help of a little attached connector so that
they form a stable unit. The intention of this product design was “to actively explore the
social interaction within which they are used, and to make the user aware of this
interaction and reflect on it” (Niedderer 2007). Subsequently, Niedderer explored several
aspects in her PhD research. Firstly; whether design objects can modify behaviour and
cause mindful interaction; secondly, whether so-called performative objects make up a
separate product category; and thirdly, what are the consequences of identifying and
designing them? Obviously, the research questions sprang from pre-theoretical invention.
The functional use of the Social Cups is the starting point of her research, which is then a
naming and classification study. Additionally, in the course of her study she undertook
some exploratory experiments regarding the disruption of an objects’ function. The series
of vessels called “Taking and Giving” (figure 10) is deduced from her categorisation of
functional, semi-functional and dysfunctional objects. At the end of the study she
introduces a new concept of mindfulness and objects’ function in the context of design.

Figure 9, 10 Kristina Niedderer: Social Cups (1999). Taking and Giving (2001/ 02)
Source: Kristina Niedderer, 2004.

Case example 3: Tomas Sokolers’ (2004) dissertation Going Beyond the Desktop with an
Attitude involves a large amount of explorative experimentation. The study consists of five
applied research projects in the field of Human Computer Interaction (HCI), more
precisely ubiquitous computing and augmented reality. Taking a design-oriented
approach to this subject, he developed innovative artefacts, which offer unprecedented
functionality, – for example a mobile phone that enables the user to ‘talk silent’, when he
or she is in a meeting (figure 11), a navigation device providing guidance through tactile
cues, or ambient displays for remote awareness. The aim was to create devices that
promote a certain attitude towards digital technology: granting the control and initiative to
people instead of giving the power to technology. Within this research, experiments
played a key role in two respects: firstly, in respect to technology, since one has to realize
concrete prototypes in order to explore and test the functionality of the devices. Concepts
and thought experiments (Kühne 2005) are not sufficient for this. Secondly, in respect to
social acceptance, human experience, and the usability of the new features offered by
the devices, since these topics cannot be explored without functional prototypes.
Reflection on, and general discussion of, the results followed subsequently even though
further steps in the generation of generalized rules or a thesis for future design activities
in the HCI field are still to be undertaken.
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Figure 11 Tomas Sokoler, Les Nelson, Sara Bly: Interface for ‘QuietCalls’ mobile phone
and a scenario for using the application (2000)
Source: Tomas Sokoler, 2004.

Case example 4: The work of Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby echos the idea of `happy
meetings` (Hacking), when neither theory nor observation and experiment proceed each
other. In his dissertation Hertzian Tales Dunne ([1999] 2005) deals with electronic
objects. He criticises the way in which they only serve utilitarian functions, while the ritual
and symbolic functions of objects remain unconsidered. Thus he makes an argument for
a branch of design research beyond commercial interests, where design – similar to art –
can inspire imagination and experience and has the potential to offer ‘complicated
pleasures’. In order to substantiate his subversive approach, he creates various
electronic objects such as Electroclimates, the only function of which is to detect and
indicate the radio frequency of mobile phones, pager etc. by blinking (fig. 12a, b). Another
object, called Faraday Chair, is based on the principle of a Faraday cage and insulates its
user from electromagnetic fields (fig. 13). Parallel to these experimental designs Dunne
develops a ‘critical design’ toolbox, containing strategies and concepts that teach how to
create this kind of ‘post-optimal objects’. He describes for example strategies for
‘estragement’ and ‘alienation’, for ‘user-unfriendliness’ and ‘para-functionality’. Dunne
comments on the meeting of experimental practice and theoretical concepts as follows:
The objects “are not necessarily illustrations of the ideas discussed in earlier chapters,
nor are the earlier chapters an explanation of these proposals. They evolved
simultaneously and are part of the same design process” (ibid:XVIII).

Figure 12a, b, 13 Anthony Dunne: Electroclimates (1999). Faraday Chair (1999)
Source: Anthony Dunne, 2004. dunneandraby.co.uk

Concluding Remarks
In the preliminary discussion of experiments, reflection-in-action, and trial-and-error in
design practice and in design research I scrutinized the categorical differences as well as
the fuzzy borders of these concepts. The reference to the philosophy of New
Experimentalism broadens our knowledge of what constitutes an experiment; it
emphasises the relevance of the material dimension, but at the same time it does not
renege on the commitment to contribute to the production of new knowledge and theory.
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Its focus on knowledge and theory, which is to some extent generalizable and applicable
to similar cases, is the crucial point that distinguishes scholarly experiment from
reflection-in-action and trial-and-error.
The case examples from design research indicate that creative works, in their capacity to
be an experimental artefact, mark the intersection of theory and practice. On the one
hand they imply theoretical considerations, and on the other they are results of a design
activity. In other words: “Design becomes here an activity of experimentally joining mental
and physical levels of the phenomenon under investigation.” (Niedderer 2004:29)
Furthermore, the case examples demonstrate that, in design research, artefacts were
created in order to make observations, to generate or to test hypotheses and finally to be
able to answer research questions. Thus, the role of experiments in design research is
comparable to the experimental sciences. Given that artefacts are necessary for this
purpose, in this respect they can be compared to the equipment, test setups and objects
of physicists, chemists, psychologists and experimental archaeologists.
Nonetheless, a fundamental difference must be pointed out: with reference to the
distinction between technology research projects and creative-production research
projects (Scrivener 2000) the role of the artefact varies. In the first case the very
feasibility, functionality and/or usability of the experimental artefact is proof of a
hypothesis or inspires the creation of theory. The knowledge gained by reflecting on the
research output is more important than the artefact itself, since this knowledge is widely
transferable to similar cases (ibid.). In the case of creative-production research projects
the output might be twofold. In order to claim scholarly validity, contextualization and
interpretation of and reflection on the artefact also has to make a contribution to
knowledge or theory. In addition it might claim to be a work of art in its own right – but in a
research context this is subordinate to the contribution it makes to the body of knowledge.
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